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MAYBE SOME OTHER TIME 
Martin Glazier 
 
Abstract: I develop a puzzle whose resolution I argue requires an unfamiliar distinction 
between two forms or senses of metaphysical modality, each bearing a different relationship 
to time. In one sense of ‘metaphysically possible’, it is metaphysically possible for it to be a 
time other than the time it is now; in another sense, this is not metaphysically possible. 
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1. Introduction 
As I write these words, it is now 2.02 p.m. But is it necessary that it is 2.02 p.m.? Or could it 
have been some other time instead? 
It may seem obvious that it could have been another time. After all, just three minutes 
ago it was 1.59 p.m., and three minutes hence it will be 2.05 p.m. So surely it is at least 
possible for it to be another time. 
In this paper, I develop a puzzling argument that seems to show that this apparently 
compelling thought leads to an absurd conclusion. But I do not believe the thought should be 
rejected on this basis. For the puzzle also relies on the implicit assumption that there is only 
one form of metaphysical modality. Although this assumption is almost universally held,1 I 
will argue that it should be abandoned. 
The result is an unfamiliar dualist conception of metaphysical modality. There is one 
form of modality on which what time it is is different in different possible worlds. In some 
                                                        
1 Three exceptions are Rosen [2006], Chalmers [2012: 449 n. 5] and Dasgupta [2013: 120–1]. 
None of these authors, however, recognize the two forms of metaphysical modality whose 
existence I defend in this paper. 
 
 2 
worlds it is 2.02 p.m., in others it is 1.59 p.m., in still others it is 2.05 p.m., and so on. But 
there is also a second form of modality on which it is the same time in every possible world. 
As philosophers we have gotten used to thinking about modality in a purely tenseless 
setting, and in such a setting it makes no sense to ask, or say, what time it is at a given 
possible world. Possible worlds, on this way of thinking, are not ‘centred’ on any particular 
moment of time. But much ordinary modal thought is tensed, as when we wonder about what 
might happen to us in the future or what we could have done differently in the past. My 
puzzle, like these ordinary thoughts, involves both modality and tense. To address it we 
require a conception of modality on which it makes sense to ask what time it is at a given 
possible world and on which possible worlds can indeed be ‘centred’ (as, for instance, in 
Lewis [1979]). 
Or, at least, we require this if we are to preserve the orthodox view that modal terms 
do not manipulate an independent time parameter in the semantics. The argument of this 
paper is primarily addressed to adherents of this orthodoxy. It should be acknowledged, 
however, that the orthodox view is not universally held2 and that those who reject orthodoxy 
will perhaps not be moved by the argument of this paper to embrace dualism. Yet even they 
may find this argument to be of value, if only as further evidence of orthodoxy’s pitfalls. In 
section 5 I briefly discuss how the puzzle might look to one who rejects orthodoxy. 
My talk of possible worlds and moments of time need not be taken too seriously. In 
fact, the puzzle I will develop can be formulated without any reference to such entities—and I 
will do so. I will not hesitate to talk of worlds and moments when it aids comprehension, but 
such talk is not strictly necessary and could be dispensed with. 
                                                        
2 A prominent challenge to orthodoxy issues from those theorists who take ‘will’ to be a 
modal, since it is plausible that ‘will’ manipulates a time parameter. Such theorists include 
(in linguistics) Enç [1996], Palmer [2001: 104–6], Kaufmann [2005], and Klecha [2013], and 
(in philosophy) Cariani and Santorio [2018]. 
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The plan is this. I begin by stating the puzzle (section 2). I dismiss some inadequate 
ways of resolving it (section 3) before introducing my central distinction between two forms 
of metaphysical modality (section 4) and showing how it puts the puzzle to rest (section 5). I 
argue that these are two independent forms of modality, with neither reducible to or definable 
in terms of the other (section 6) before concluding (section 7). 
 
2. The Puzzle of Possible Peace 
The puzzling argument has two premises, one involving possibility and one involving 
necessity. 
To motivate the possibility premise, visualize world peace. Imagine that tomorrow all 
the warring nations of the world lay down their arms, so that every country now at war is at 
peace. Clearly, this is possible; it is possible for it to be the case that every country now at 
war is at peace. And clearly this is possible even if we understand ‘every country now at war 
is at peace’ so that it is nonvacuously true if true at all—that is, so that its truth requires at 
least one positive instance. So understood, this is our possibility premise: possibly, every 
country now at war is at peace. 
To motivate the necessity premise, consider any true statement whatsoever. This 
statement, no matter what it is, will also be true now. And conversely, consider any statement 
that is true now; no matter what it is, it will also be true. This does not seem to be an accident. 
It is no accident, that is, that whatever is true is true now and vice versa. On the contrary, this 
generalization has a kind of necessity. That is our necessity premise: necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ 
iff now ϕ. 
There was, to be sure, a tradition in twentieth-century philosophy according to which 
necessity was to be explained away as a linguistic phenomenon. Think of ‘bachelors are 
unmarried’, for instance, or ‘p iff ∼∼p’, or even ‘2 + 2 = 4’. These statements appear to be 
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necessary, but this appearance was taken as an indication not of their possessing any genuine 
necessity but simply of their being analytically true. And although today few would endorse 
this kind of deflationary treatment across the board, one still sometimes sees it proposed in 
particular cases. 
The question of when exactly a deflationary treatment of apparent necessity is 
warranted is too large to address here. But in my view it is no more plausible for the case of 
‘ϕ iff now ϕ’ than it is for ‘p iff ∼∼p’. I will therefore set aside the possibility of this 
treatment in what follows, though the issue certainly deserves further discussion. 
Our two premises give rise to the puzzle of possible peace. 
(1) Possibly, every country now at war is at peace. (Possibility premise) 
(2) So possibly, there is a country x such that x is now at war and x is at peace. 
(From 1) 
(3) Necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff now ϕ. (Necessity premise) 
(4) So necessarily, if there is a country x such that x is now at war and x is at 
peace, then there is a country x such that x is at war and x is at peace. (From 3) 
(5) So possibly, there is a country x such that x is at war and x is at peace. (From 2 
and 4) 
The conclusion (5) is absurd. Yet it appears to follow from the premises (1) and (3) by way of 
the intermediate steps (2) and (4). 
To obtain (2) from (1), we note that we are understanding ‘every country now at war 
is at peace’ so that it is nonvacuously true if true at all. So in any possible world at which this 
statement is true, there must be some country that is now at war. Since by (1) this country 
must also be at peace, we have (2). 
We obtain (4) from (3) as follows. Let x be a country such that x is now at war and x 
is at peace. Instantiating the quantifier in (3), we have that from ‘x is now at war’ it 
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necessarily follows that x is at war. And so from ‘x is now at war and x is at peace’ it 
necessarily follows that x is at war and x is at peace. This straightforwardly yields (4). 
(5) then appears to follow from (2) and (4) by the modal axiom K. (2) says that the 
following thing is possible: there is a country x such that x is now at war and x is at peace. 
And (4) says that it necessarily follows from ‘there is a country x such that x is now at war 
and x is at peace’ that there is a country x such that x is at war and x is at peace. But it is a 
consequence of axiom K that anything which necessarily follows from something possible 
must itself be possible ((◇A ∧	□(A → B)) → ◇B). And so we have (5). 
Our formulation of the puzzle has employed (in the necessity premise) quantification 
into sentence position, but it is worth noting that other formulations are available. For 
example, we might instead state the necessity premise by means of a schema. We might also 
formulate the puzzle using only first-order quantification over propositions, provided we 
admit tensed propositions.3 The differences between these formulations will not matter for 
our purposes. I will officially work with the formulation that employs quantification into 
sentence position, though I will often semantically ascend for ease of presentation. 
 
3. Some Inadequate Responses to the Puzzle 
3.1 Objecting to Tense 
Some may be tempted to dismiss the puzzle because it is stated in tensed terms. Indeed, this 
is an essential feature of the puzzle: without tense it cannot even be raised. And some 
philosophers (such as Sider [2001]) believe that the most metaphysically perspicuous 
description of the world will not involve tense at all. They are happy to allow, of course, that 
such a description may include tenseless statements about what is the case at various times. 
Thus it might include statements like ‘at t1 I stand’, ‘at t2 I sit’, and ‘at t3 I walk’. But it will 
                                                        
3 Brogaard [2012] is a recent defence of tensed propositions. 
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not, they believe, include tensed statements like ‘I stood’, ‘I am sitting’, and ‘I will walk’. 
Such tensed statements, these philosophers worry, presuppose a distinction between the past, 
the present, and the future, and they deny that the world in itself makes any such distinction. 
But even if these philosophers are right to exclude tensed statements from the most 
metaphysically perspicuous description of the world, they must still admit that such 
statements can be true. I am here in my chair in front of my computer; however tenseless the 
world may be at its fundamental level, it can hardly be denied that I am sitting. Even these 
philosophers, then, should agree that the puzzle presents us with apparently true statements 
that apparently entail an unacceptable conclusion. And so they still must offer a response; the 
puzzle, even for them, cannot simply be dismissed. 
Other philosophers may be suspicious of our tensed puzzle for a different reason. 
These philosophers refuse to countenance tensed propositions [Moore 1927; Stalnaker 1970; 
Lewis 1980]. They agree that there are tensed sentences, of course, but they hold that the 
propositions stated by such sentences are invariably tenseless. But we may respond in much 
the same way as before. Even if the tensed sentences (1) and (3) state tenseless propositions, 
these sentences still appear to be true and to entail an unacceptable conclusion, and so a 
response to the puzzle is still required. 
There is admittedly a view on which the puzzle can be dismissed.4 On this view, there 
are no tensed sentences. There are only tensed utterances, which may be used to state in an 
elliptical way what is properly stated by means of a tenseless sentence. For example, when I 
utter ‘I am sitting’, the relevant tenseless sentence is something like ‘I am sitting at t0’; I 
simply elide the words ‘at t0’. 
This view, however, is not very plausible. Of course, the phenomenon of linguistic 
ellipsis is real enough. For example, in response to ‘Who will answer the door?’, one may say 
                                                        
4 I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this view. 
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‘I will’, thereby eliding ‘answer the door’. But in such cases we have the strong sense that 
some words are being left out. We have no such sense in the case of ‘I am sitting’. I will 
therefore assume that this view is false and that we have no choice but to address the puzzle 
directly. 
 
3.2 Rejecting the Possibility Premise 
It might be thought that a response to the puzzle is easily given by means of a scope 
distinction. One might reject the possibility premise of the puzzle 
(1)  Possibly, every country now at war is at peace 
but attempt to soften the blow by pointing out that there is a true claim ‘in the vicinity’: every 
country now at war is such that, possibly, it is at peace. In effect, the original possibility 
claim, whose operator takes wide scope, is replaced with one whose operator takes narrow 
scope. The puzzle will then no longer arise. 
But this response fails to resolve the puzzle. To be sure, the replacement, narrow-
scope claim is doubtless true. For take any now-warring country. It could simply surrender 
tomorrow, even if other countries continued to fight. The problem is that the original, wide-
scope claim is also true. For it is also possible for all the now-warring countries to be at peace 
together. It is this claim that gives rise to the puzzle. 
We can now see why we have formulated the puzzle in precisely the way we have. 
Why did we not simply take 
(2) Possibly, there is a country x such that x is now at war and x is at peace 
as a premise of the puzzle, given its intrinsic plausibility, and leave (1) aside altogether? The 
reason is that, in the absence of (1), someone might try to reject (2) in exactly the way we 
considered rejecting (1). Someone might replace the wide-scope claim (2), that is, with the 
narrow-scope claim that there is a country x such that x is now at war and possibly, x is at 
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peace. This narrow-scope claim does not give rise to the puzzle. But the evident truth of the 
wide-scope possibility premise (1) blocks this response. For it forces upon us the wide-scope 
claim (2). 
There is yet another narrow-scope replacement claim that should be considered. One 
might replace the wide-scope possibility premise (1) with the narrow-scope claim that the 
countries now at war are such that possibly, they are at peace. Where the possibility premise 
employs singular or individual quantification, this new replacement claim employs plural 
quantification, or plural reference. This plural claim does not give rise to the puzzle. 
We are not yet in a position to address this pluralist resolution of the puzzle. We will 
return to it in section 3.4. Let us set it aside for the moment and take up the other premise of 
the puzzle. 
 
3.3 Rejecting the Necessity Premise 
The necessity premise of the puzzle is 
(3) Necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff now ϕ. 
Might there be a way to reject this claim? 
The claim is hard to deny in the case of tensed statements. If I am sitting, for instance, 
then I must also be sitting now. And in the other direction, if I am sitting now, then I must 
also be sitting. 
But what about tenseless statements? Although 2 + 2 = 4, it might be thought that it is 
not now the case that 2 + 2 = 4. Or again, although the fifteenth century is an artistically 
important period, it might be thought that this truth does not hold now. Such tenseless 
statements, one might object, are not properly said to be true at a time. Rather, they are true 
regardless of the time. 
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A straightforward response to this objection would be to restrict the quantifier in ‘for 
all ϕ, ϕ iff now ϕ’ to cases in which ϕ is tensed. The reasoning of the puzzle, as detailed in 
section 2, only requires the necessity premise to license the inference from ‘x is now at war’ 
to ‘x is at war’. Since ‘x is at war’ is a tensed statement, the puzzle only requires the 
quantifier in the necessity premise to range over tensed statements. Everything I say in the 
remainder of the paper is easily modified to be compatible with this response to the objection. 
I am inclined, however, to prefer a different response which leads to a simpler overall 
view. This is to insist that, even if there is a restrictive sense of ‘now’ in which tenseless 
statements cannot be said to be true now, there is also an ordinary sense in which they can. It 
makes perfect sense to say, for example, that although the world has changed a great deal 
since 2019, life is not without its constants—since after all it was true then and it is still true 
now that 2 + 2 = 4. In this sense of ‘now’, the tenseless statements that are true now are 
simply the tenseless statements that are true. Following Fine [2005: 322–4], let us call this the 
extended sense of ‘now’. 
The necessity premise of the puzzle is true when understood in the extended sense. 
The possibility premise, of course, is also true when understood in the extended sense, and 
the inference from premises to conclusion remains as plausible as before. The puzzle 
therefore still arises when ‘now’ is understood in the extended sense throughout. 
 
3.4 An Equivocation on ‘Now’? 
Yet another potential response to the puzzle is to argue that it arises merely from an 
equivocation between two different senses of ‘now’ (both of which are extended). The 
possibility premise involves one sense; the necessity premise involves the other sense. Thus 
the intermediate steps (2) and (4) also involve different senses of ‘now’ and so the conclusion 
(5) does not follow from them. But what might these two senses of ‘now’ be? 
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Arthur Prior [1968] distinguished redundant and nonredundant senses of ‘now’. 
When a sentence token is prefixed with ‘now’ in its nonredundant sense, that ensures that its 
moment of evaluation is the present, even if the token lies within the scope of another 
operator. The redundant sense of ‘now’, by contrast, is semantically inert; it does not shift the 
moment of evaluation. To illustrate, consider the statement ‘tomorrow there will come a 
storm stronger than any we now know’. If this statement is true at all, it is true only in the 
nonredundant sense of ‘now’. 
One might now suggest that one of the puzzle’s premises involves one of these senses 
of ‘now’, while the other premise involves the other sense. But which premise involves which 
sense? The possibility premise 
(1) Possibly, every country now at war is at peace 
cannot be understood in the redundant sense. For if it were so understood, then 
(2) Possibly, there is a country x such that x is now at war and x is at peace 
would also involve the redundant sense and so would be equivalent to 
(5) Possibly, there is a country x such that x is at war and x is at peace. 
Thus if the possibility premise (1) is understood redundantly, absurdity follows even without 
the necessity premise. 
If this response to the puzzle is to have any hope of success, then, the possibility 
premise must be understood to involve the nonredundant sense. And so it is the necessity 
premise 
(3) Necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff now ϕ  
that will have to be understood to involve the redundant sense. 
It is not at all clear, however, that there even is a redundant sense. The standard view 
for the past half-century has been that ‘now’ is univocally nonredundant [Kamp 1971; Vlach 
1973; Cresswell 1990]. And even if one is prepared to abandon that view, this response still 
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fails to resolve the puzzle. For although the necessity premise is of course plausible when 
understood redundantly, it is also plausible when understood nonredundantly. It is hardly an 
accident, after all, that whenever something is true it also turns out to be true right now, 
nonredundantly, at this very moment, and vice versa. And since, as we have seen, the 
possibility premise can only be understood nonredundantly, we still face the absurd 
conclusion (5). 
But although the puzzle arises when ‘now’ is understood nonredundantly throughout, 
it might be thought that there are in fact two nonredundant senses of ‘now’. One of these 
senses is rigid; the other is nonrigid. When a sentence token is prefixed with ‘now’ in the 
rigid sense, that ensures that its world of evaluation is the actual world, even if the token lies 
within the scope of another operator.5 The nonrigid sense, by contrast, does not shift the 
world of evaluation (though since it is nonredundant it may shift the moment of evaluation). It 
is true only in the rigid sense that possibly, the man who is now president is never born. After 
all, any possible world at which a man is never born is a world at which he is never president. 
And it is true only in the nonrigid sense that possibly, Trump is now president. After all, at 
the actual world, Trump is not now president. 
One might now suggest that one of the premises of the puzzle involves one of these 
senses of ‘now’ while the other involves the other. The necessity premise is not plausibly 
understood to involve the rigid sense, since it is clearly possible for things to differ from how 
they are now at the actual world. It will therefore have to be understood to involve the 
nonrigid sense. 
The possibility premise must then be understood to involve the other, rigid sense. So 
understood, the premise says that there is a possible world w such that every country now at 
                                                        
5 A similar treatment is standardly given of the behaviour of ‘actually’ in sentences like 
‘possibly, everyone actually rich is poor’. See, for example, Crossley and Humberstone [1977]. 
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war at the actual world is, at w, at peace. And this is clearly true. Indeed, it is probably the 
most natural reading of ‘possibly, every country now at war is at peace’. 
This response, then, has significant appeal. Nevertheless, it fails to resolve the puzzle. 
For although the possibility premise is plausible when understood rigidly, it is also plausible 
when understood nonrigidly. 
To see why, start by considering the following principle: 
 
Possibility of the past. For all ϕ, if it was the case that ϕ, then possibly ϕ. 
 
Whatever was true, that is, is possibly true. 
This principle is very plausible.6 After all, if ϕ has already managed to be the case, 
then there is nothing about the world, or about ϕ, to block ϕ from being the case. And so how 
could ϕ fail to be possible? 
We now make the following observation: at one time in the past—in 1954, as it 
happens—every country now at war was at peace. But is this true in the rigid sense of ‘now’ 
or in the nonrigid sense? Both! Since our observation concerns the actual world, it makes no 
difference to its truth whether ‘now’ is taken to be rigid or nonrigid. It is the case in both 
senses of ‘now’ that in 1954, every country now at war was at peace. And so the principle of 
the possibility of the past entails that, in both senses of ‘now’, possibly, every country now at 
war is at peace. In particular, then, the principle entails that this holds in the nonrigid sense. 
And so the possibility premise is plausible when understood nonrigidly. 
If we are to grasp the nonrigid reading of the possibility premise, we need to resist our 
natural inclination to read it rigidly. It may help to consider how the truth of the nonrigid 
reading could be witnessed. The above argument from the possibility of the past suggests one 
                                                        
6 It is also a consequence of the ‘perpetuity’ principle defended by Dorr and Goodman [2020]. 
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kind of witness possible world: a world in which the countries now at war there are the actual 
now-warring countries. And this witness is indeed sufficient to establish the truth of the 
nonrigid reading. But there are other witness worlds in which the countries now at war there 
are not the actual now-warring countries. 
Consider two countries that are actually now at peace—Switzerland and Sweden, say. 
Imagine a movie depicting a present-day Swiss invasion of Sweden in an otherwise peaceful 
world. And suppose the movie contains a flashback to the halcyon days before the war. In the 
flashback, Switzerland and Sweden are at peace—but not for long, since in the world of the 
movie they are now at war. The possible world depicted by this flashback witnesses the truth 
of the nonrigid reading. 
Movies aside, the principle of the possibility of the past on its own ensures the 
plausibility of the possibility premise, understood nonrigidly. And since, as we have seen, the 
necessity premise can only be understood nonrigidly, we again face the absurd conclusion 
(5). The puzzle arises when ‘now’ is understood nonrigidly throughout. 
One might attempt to avoid this conclusion by objecting to the principle of the 
possibility of the past in the following way. In 1666, St Paul’s Cathedral burned down in the 
Great Fire of London. The principle thus entails that possibly, the cathedral burns down. But 
one might insist that this is not possible, since it has already burned down and so cannot burn 
down again. This objection is compelling, however, only if the principle is taken to involve 
the ‘historical’ notion of possibility [Prior 1967: ch. 7], which holds fixed the world’s history, 
including the cathedral’s demise. But it is much more plausible to take the principle to 
involve metaphysical possibility, which does not hold history fixed. The objection therefore 
fails. 
But even though the principle should be allowed to stand, one might object to its use 
here. We argued that given the principle, the possibility premise 
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(1) Possibly, every country now at war is at peace 
follows from the observation that in 1954 every country now at war was at peace. But does 
this observation not entail only that possibly, every country now at war was at peace? 
No. For the use of the past tense in ‘in 1954 every country now at war was at peace’ is 
plausibly taken merely to signal that 1954 is in the past. (After all, the intended meaning is 
not that in 1954 it was the case at some still earlier time that every country now at war was 
then at peace.) To be sure, it is correct to say that it was the case (in 1954) that every country 
now at war was at peace. But it is equally correct to say, in the style of the tense logicians, 
that it was the case (in 1954) that every country now at war is at peace. Here we employ a 
disengaged use of the tensed predicate ‘is at peace’, one that in itself specifies nothing about 
the time at which it is instantiated. Applied to this claim of ‘tense logic-ese’, the principle of 
the possibility of the past does indeed entail that possibly, every country now at war is at 
peace. 
The principle also allows us to address the pluralist resolution of the puzzle, which we 
set temporarily aside in section 3.2. According to this resolution, the possibility premise (1) 
of the puzzle, which employs individual quantification, is false, and in fact what is true is the 
plural claim that the countries now at war are such that possibly, they are at peace. But we are 
now in a position to see that, although the plural claim is doubtless true, so is the individual 
claim (1). For in 1954 every (individual) country now at war was at peace, and so given the 
principle of the possibility of the past, (1) follows. The puzzle persists! 
The puzzle arises, we have seen, when both of its premises are taken to involve the 
extended, nonredundant, nonrigid sense of ‘now’. So understood, the premises are plausible 
yet appear to lead to an absurd conclusion. We will understand ‘now’ in this sense for the 




4. Proprial and Nonproprial Modality 
We have seen that the puzzle cannot be resolved by rejecting either the possibility premise or 
the necessity premise. Nor does it rest on an equivocation between different senses of ‘now’. 
But I will argue that the puzzle does rest on an equivocation—only the equivocation is 
not between different senses of ‘now’ but rather between different senses of the modal 
operators. The premises of the puzzle involve different forms of modality. The notion of 
possibility involved in the possibility premise is not the dual of the notion of necessity 
involved in the necessity premise. And so the modal axiom K does not license the inference 
from (2) and (4) to the absurd conclusion (5). 
The two forms of modality differ in their relationship to the time it is now. It will be 
convenient to have a name for this time; let us use ‘Now’. The time or moment Now should 
be sharply distinguished from the tense operator ‘now ϕ’ which has figured so prominently in 
the paper thus far. 
Call a moment t veridical if it is the unique moment such that for all ϕ: ϕ iff at t, ϕ. It 
is then easy to see that Now is veridical; we need only consider cases. Thus not only is it true 
that I am sitting, it is also true at Now that I am sitting, and vice versa. And let us understand 
‘at t’ in an extended sense analogous to the extended sense of ‘now’, so that tenseless 
statements fit the pattern too: not only is it true that 2 + 2 = 4, it is also true at Now that 2 + 2 
= 4, and so on. In general, then, whatever is true is true at Now and vice versa. In this sense, 
what is true is aligned with Now. 
What is more, Now is unique in this respect. After all, the way the world is at the 
moment Now will differ somehow from the way it is at any past or future moment t, if only 
with respect to whether t is past or future. Thus since what is true is aligned with Now, it 
cannot be aligned with this other moment t. Now, therefore, is the unique moment such that 
whatever is true is true at it and vice versa, and so Now is veridical. 
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The veridicality of Now is in one sense necessary. After all, it is no accident that 
whatever is true is true at Now and vice versa, and it is also no accident that what is true at 
Now will differ from what is true at any other moment t, if only with respect to whether t is 
past or future. This sense of necessity requires our own moment to be veridical and so we will 
call it the proprial sense (from the Latin for ‘own’). 
But there is another sense in which the veridicality of Now is not necessary. After all, 
which moment is veridical changes over time. If t is a past moment, then although t is not 
veridical, it was veridical. And so section 3.4’s principle of the possibility of the past entails 
that possibly, t is veridical. (A parallel argument establishes the possibility of a future 
moment’s veridicality.) So although in fact Now is veridical, it is possible for some other 
moment to be veridical. Of course, this is not possible in the proprial sense; in that sense, 
Now is necessarily veridical. It must therefore be possible in another, nonproprial sense.7 
These two senses or forms of modality, proprial and nonproprial, are the key to our 
resolution of the puzzle of possible peace. But before we present this resolution, let us say 
more about these two forms of modality. 
They differ, as we have seen, over which moments are possibly veridical. In the 
nonproprial sense, moments other than Now are possibly veridical; in the proprial sense they 
are not. But notice that a moment is veridical if, and only if, that moment is what time it is. 
For the left-to-right direction, suppose first that some moment t is veridical. Then whatever is 
true at t is true simpliciter. One of the things that is true at t is: t is what time it is. It follows 
that it is true simpliciter that t is what time it is. For the right-to-left direction, suppose that t 
is what time it is. Whatever this fact ultimately amounts to, it surely entails that whatever is 
                                                        
7 It must then be the nonproprial form of possibility which figures in the principle of the 
possibility of the past. 
 
 17 
true is true at t and vice versa. And since what is true at t will differ from what is true at any 
other moment, this entails that t is veridical. 
This link between veridicality and what time it is can help us to understand proprial 
and nonproprial modality (and I will make use of it freely in what follows). Since proprial 
modality holds fixed which moment is veridical, and since the veridical moment is what time 
it is, we may gloss the proprial notions as necessity and possibility given what time it is. In 
the proprial sense, it is necessary what time it is: Now. Nonproprial modality, by contrast, 
allows for variation in which moment is veridical, and so we may gloss the nonproprial 
notions as necessity and possibility regardless of what time it is. In the nonproprial sense, it is 
possible for it to be a time other than Now. 
Despite its unfamiliarity to philosophers, the distinction between proprial and 
nonproprial modality is not absent from our ordinary thought. We naturally think, for 
instance, that I could not have been a fried egg. Since we mean I could not have been a fried 
egg, not only now, but at any time, we here have in mind the nonproprial form of modality. 
But we also think that if I am to freely consent to something, then it must be possible for me 
not to consent to it.8 And we mean this must be possible now, for if it were possible only in 
ten years then my consent would not be so free after all. Here we have in mind the proprial 
form of modality. 
Where we have a form of modality, we have a domain of possible worlds. We have 
proprial and nonproprial forms of modality, so we have two domains of possible worlds. At 
every proprially possible world it is the same time: Now. The nonproprially possible worlds, 
by contrast, vary with respect to what time it is and perhaps also, as we will see below, with 
                                                        
8 Frankfurt [1969] famously held that there are cases in which one acts in a way for which one 
is morally responsible, even though, in some sense, one could not have done otherwise. But 
even Frankfurt’s cases provide the metaphysical possibility of doing otherwise, which is all 
that is relevant here. See Vihvelin [1996] and Sider [2002] for related discussion of the link 
between freedom and metaphysical possibility. 
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respect to whether it is any time at all. Clearly, both the proprial and nonproprial worlds 
should be conceived of as being capable of being ‘centred’ on some moment. They are 
worlds about which it makes sense to ask ‘what time is it there?’ 
 
5. Resolution of the Puzzle 
We can now give our resolution of the puzzle of possible peace. The possibility premise is 
true only if possibility is understood nonproprially, while the necessity premise is true only if 
necessity is understood proprially. And so no matter how the modal notions involved in the 
puzzle are understood, the absurd conclusion does not follow. 
Consider first the possibility premise 
(1) Possibly, every country now at war is at peace. 
Since we are understanding ‘now’ nonrigidly, this premise requires there to be a possible 
world w at which every country that is now at war in w is also at peace in w. Clearly, this 
must be a world in which it is a time other than Now. And so it must be a nonproprial world. 
This premise is therefore true only in the nonproprial sense. 
Consider next the necessity premise 
(3) Necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff now ϕ. 
If, no matter which possible world we choose, everything true is true now and vice versa, 
then it must be that no matter which possible world we choose, the time it is is Now. The 
possible worlds in question, then, are the proprial ones, and so the premise is true only in the 
proprial sense. 
Since the premises cannot be plausibly understood to involve the same form of 
modality, we face no pressure to accept the absurd conclusion 
(5) Possibly, there is a country x such that x is at war and x is at peace. 
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And indeed this is false no matter how possibility is understood. For consider any possible 
world, whether proprial or nonproprial. Whatever time it is there, at that time there cannot be 
a country that is both at war and at peace. 
That is our treatment of the puzzle. But will this treatment overgenerate and force us 
to accept similar modal distinctions elsewhere? Consider a spatial variant of the puzzle, 
which results from replacing the possibility premise with ‘possibly, everything here is far 
away’ and the necessity premise with ‘necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff here ϕ’. Or consider a 
purely modal variant of the puzzle whose premises are ‘possibly, everyone actually rich is 
poor’ and ‘necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff actually ϕ’. We might even consider a subjectivist or 
perspectival variant of the puzzle whose premises are ‘possibly, everything which is from my 
perspective tasty is disgusting’ and ‘necessarily, for all ϕ, ϕ iff from my perspective ϕ’. Must 
we respond to these variant puzzles in the same way we responded to the puzzle of possible 
peace? And so must we distinguish spatially proprial and nonproprial forms of modality, and 
perspectivally proprial and nonproprial forms, and so on? 
I would be happy if the answer were ‘yes’, since my own view is that we should 
accept these distinctions. But I also think that the variant puzzles are different enough from 
the puzzle of possible peace that they alone should not force us to accept their corresponding 
distinctions. The best arguments for these distinctions, I believe, require resources beyond the 
puzzle ‘template’.9 
Here is one reason for this (not the only one). In section 3.4 we argued that, since both 
premises of the puzzle of possible peace are plausible in a nonredundant, nonrigid sense of 
‘now’, the puzzle cannot be dissolved by distinguishing rigid and nonrigid senses. An 
                                                        
9 I discuss arguments in favor of the perspectival distinction in Glazier [2020] and in favor of 




analogous argument will need to be made for each of the variant puzzles if they are not to be 
dissolved in the same way. 
Now in order to argue that both premises of the puzzle of possible peace are plausible 
in the nonrigid sense of ‘now’, we appealed to the principle of the possibility of the past, the 
claim that for all ϕ, if it was the case that ϕ, then possibly ϕ. For the variant puzzles, we will 
need to appeal to analogous principles. In the case of perspective, for example, the analogous 
principle is that for any ϕ, if from someone’s perspective ϕ, then possibly ϕ.10 But this 
principle does not, I think, enjoy quite as much intuitive support as does the principle of the 
possibility of the past (the same goes for the principle for place). Further argument is 
required. 
Matters are different with the purely modal variant. Here the problem lies not with the 
analogous principle, which turns out to be trivially true, but with the prior question of 
whether there even is a nonredundant, nonrigid sense of ‘actually’. Most philosophers would 
answer ‘no’, since most philosophers hold that any nonredundant sense of ‘actually’ will 
obey the principle that for all ϕ, if ϕ, then necessarily actually ϕ. I myself believe there are 
good reasons to reject this principle, but that again requires further argument.11 
Let me conclude this section by mentioning an alternative way of resolving the 
puzzle, one more linguistic than metaphysical.12 This resolution involves the rejection of the 
orthodox view that modal terms do not manipulate an independent time parameter in the 
semantics. A ‘heterodox’ theorist who rejects this view might respond to the puzzle as 
follows. Rather than recognize two different forms of modality, she might recognize two 
different uses of modal language. The possibility premise of the puzzle, according to her, 
involves a use of a modal term (‘possibly’) on which that term manipulates the time 
                                                        
10 I discuss this principle in Glazier [2020]. 
11 I argue against the principle in Glazier [ms] and Glazier and Krämer [ms]. 
12 I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this alternative. 
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parameter. The necessity premise, by contrast, involves a use of a modal term (‘necessarily’) 
on which that term does not manipulate the time parameter.13 And she may then argue that 
because the puzzle’s premises involve different uses of modal language, the absurd 
conclusion does not follow from them. This alternative treatment of the puzzle deserves a 
fuller examination; however there is no space for that examination here, and so I must leave 
the task for another time. 
 
6. Against Reduction 
To resolve the puzzle of possible peace, I have argued, we must distinguish proprial and 
nonproprial modality. But are these two independent forms of modality, or can one be 
reduced to or defined in terms of the other? I believe that no such definition can be given, and 
although I cannot here consider all potential definitions, I will argue against the two I take to 
be most promising. 
To begin, it is natural to suspect that proprial necessity can be defined as a conditional 
form of nonproprial necessity in the following way: for it to be proprially necessary that ϕ is 
just for it to be nonproprially necessary that, if Now is veridical, then ϕ. 
An immediate difficulty arises. Consider the case in which ϕ itself is ‘Now is 
veridical’. Then it is proprially necessary that ϕ. But soon a moment other than Now will be 
veridical, and so soon it will no longer be proprially necessary that ϕ. Yet it will still be 
nonproprially necessary that if Now is veridical then ϕ. 
We may avoid this difficulty by removing from the definition the reference to the 
particular moment Now. Instead, we may say that for it to be proprially necessary that ϕ is 
                                                        
13 These two uses of modal language might be characterized in terms of the framework of 
Lewis [1980], in which a sentence has its truth value relative to (among other things) a time 
and an uncentred possible world. The time-manipulating uses may be taken to be those which 
manipulate both the world and time parameter, the non-time-manipulating uses those which 
manipulate only the world parameter. 
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just for the veridical moment, whatever it is, to be such that it is nonproprially necessary that, 
if that moment is veridical, then ϕ. That is, it is for there to be some moment t such that (i) t is 
veridical and (ii) it is nonproprially necessary that, if t is veridical, then ϕ.14 
But as Kit Fine [2002: 265–6] has pointed out in a different context, this style of 
definition faces an objection. Consider again the case in which ϕ is ‘Now is veridical’. It is 
proprially necessary that ϕ, and according to the revised definition, this will amount to its 
being the case that (i) ϕ is true and (ii) it is nonproprially necessary that if ϕ then ϕ. But (ii) is 
simply an instance of self-entailment, which surely does nothing to help make ϕ necessary. 
Thus the proprial necessity of ϕ, on the revised definition, will simply amount to the truth of 
ϕ—and yet this does not seem possible. Truth is one thing, necessity another. 
If we cannot define proprial modality in terms of nonproprial modality, what about 
the other direction? One might suspect that for it to be nonproprially possible that ϕ is just for 
there to be some moment at which it is proprially possible that ϕ. 
This definition faces two objections. First, it cannot account for the possibility of a 
nonactual moment’s being veridical. Suppose, for instance, that time will come to an end at 
some future moment t. Even so, one might still think it possible for time not to come to an 
end and so for some nonactual moment t+, later than t, to be veridical. But since t+ is distinct 
from Now, it is not proprially possible for t+ to be veridical. Nor, given the definition, is it 
nonproprially possible. For since t+ is distinct from every actual moment, there is no actual 
moment at which it is proprially possible for t+ to be veridical. 
Second, the definition cannot account for the possibility that no moment is veridical. 
One might think it possible, for instance, for time not to exist, perhaps on the grounds that 
reality could have consisted of nothing other than the timeless immaterial realm of 
                                                        




mathematics.15 But clearly there is no moment at which this is proprially possible, and so 
given the definition, it will not be nonproprially possible either. 
I do not know whether these possibilities—that a nonactual moment is veridical, and 
that no moment is—are genuine or illusory. But the question whether they are genuine is 
clearly a matter of substantive debate and is not to be settled merely by definition.16 
But although these definitions should be rejected, our investigations in this section 
have not been altogether fruitless. Consider again our proposed definition of proprial 
necessity as a conditional form of nonproprial necessity. Although as a definition it is 
unacceptable, it does appear to be extensionally adequate. It appears, therefore, that the 
following material biconditional is true: 
 
Proprial–nonproprial link. It is proprially necessary that ϕ iff the veridical moment is 
such that it is nonproprially necessary that, if that moment is veridical, then ϕ. 
 
And this link does shed some light on the relationship between our two forms of modality. It 
entails, for instance, that whatever is nonproprially necessary is proprially necessary and that 
whatever is proprially possible is nonproprially possible. 
This last point helps clarify the relationship between the proprially possible worlds 
and the nonproprially possible worlds. Since whatever is proprially possible is nonproprially 
possible, it must be that for every proprial world, there is a corresponding nonproprial world 
                                                        
15 The possibility that time might not have existed has been appealed to in a different context 
by Sider [2001: 99–100]. 
16 The second of our two objections is also a difficulty for definitions of the nonproprial 
possibility of ϕ obtained by prefixing ϕ with any sequence of the operators ‘there is some 
moment at which it is the case that’ and ‘it is proprially possible that’. 
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at which exactly the same statements are true. But is this nonproprial world distinct from the 
corresponding proprial world, or identical to it? 
We can go either way. If we say the worlds are distinct, we arrive at a view on which 
there are two disjoint collections of worlds, proprial and nonproprial. On this view, just as 
there are two forms of modality, so there are two kinds of possible worlds. If on the other 
hand we say the worlds are identical, we arrive at a view on which the proprial worlds form a 
subset of the nonproprial worlds. On this view, although there are two forms of modality, 
there is but a single collection of possible worlds, all of which are nonproprial and some of 
which are proprial. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that it is only by recognizing the distinction between the proprial and 
nonproprial forms of metaphysical modality that the puzzle of possible peace can be resolved. 
If I am right, then by careful consideration of the puzzle we have arrived at a certain, not 
unattractive, picture of modality and time. The world is affixed by the glue of necessity to our 
moment in particular. But it retains the potential to adhere to some other moment instead. 
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